Clear Statement Rules and the Integrity of Labor Arbitration by Ross, Stephen & Eisenhardt, Roy
Arbitration Law Review
Volume 10 Issue 1 (Arbitration Law Review) Article 1
4-3-2018
Clear Statement Rules and the Integrity of Labor
Arbitration
Stephen Ross
Penn State Law, sfr10@psu.edu
Roy Eisenhardt
University of California, Berkeley, dawghous@pacbell.net
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration
Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law
Commons, and the Sports Studies Commons
This Professional Submission is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Arbitration Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact
ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen Ross & Roy Eisenhardt, Clear Statement Rules and the Integrity of Labor Arbitration, 10 Arb. L. Rev. 1 (2018).
Clear Statement Rules and the Integrity of Labor Arbitration
Cover Page Footnote
Ross is Professor of Law and Executive Director, Center for the Study of Sports in Society, Pennsylvania State
University. Eisenhardt is Lecturer in Sports Law, Berkeley Law, University of California (Berkeley), and
former President of the Oakland Athletics baseball club. We thank Professors Doug Allen and Paul Whitehead
of the School of Labor and Employment Relations at Penn State for their critical insights, general assistance
from Professor Roger Abrams, and Krista Dean and Nicholas Lyskin for research assistance.
This professional submission is available in Arbitration Law Review: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview/vol10/iss1/1
1 
 
 
Clear Statement Rules and the Integrity of Labor 
Arbitration 
 
Stephen F. Ross and Roy Eisenhardt* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Under the common law, employment contracts are submitted to civil courts to resolve 
disputes over interpretation, breach, and remedies.  As an alternative, parties in collective 
bargaining agreements, can agree to dispute resolution by an independent arbitrator, 
whose decision is reviewed deferentially by judges.  Where employees or members of an 
association are governed by its internal rules, in contrast, they often agree contractually 
to submit internal disputes to an association officer or committee.  In this circumstance, 
the common law governing private associations affords judicial review that is more limited 
than a civil dispute, but more searching than is the case for an impartial labor arbitrator.  
Recently, the National Football League and its players have gone to federal court in well-
known disputes concerning player discipline. Although the collective bargaining 
agreement expressly removes these issues from impartial arbitration, recent cases have 
curiously been litigated as if the league commissioner is an independent arbitrator.  This 
Article suggests that this is the wrong characterization of the league commissioner’s legal 
role.  Treating the commissioner as if he were an arbitrator creates an anomaly: a 
unionized player’s grounds for judicial review are more narrowly defined than discipline 
of a non-union employee, even for the same behavior.  The use of management personnel 
in lieu of an independent arbitrator also elevates the temptation for federal judges to 
stretch the deferential rules of review of labor arbitration developed for independent 
arbitrators.  We discuss the baseline law of private association and why it is a superior 
standard of judicial review in player disciplinary cases, where there has been no review 
by an independent arbitrator. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Within our judicial system, there is a broad spectrum of standards that apply to 
judicial review of an initial decision resolving a civil dispute.  In a civil action, the parties 
may seek review by an appellate court, which will thoroughly examine the record for 
mistakes of law and fact.1  As an alternative to the judicial process, parties often agree to 
non-judicial commercial or labor arbitration by an independent arbitrator.  In this context, 
the losing party retains the right of judicial review.  However, the process is a more-limited 
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motion to vacate the arbitral award in federal court.2  In the case of a private association, 
the member-parties are bound by agreement to the association’s rules. Generally this 
involves submission of their claims to an internal officer or committee.   Therefore, in 
private association cases, state common law provides the scope for judicial review of 
actions by the association’s designated officer or tribunal.3   
 Each of these categories incorporates a prescribed and different standard of judicial 
review, which range from very broad in civil actions, to very narrow in the case of an 
appeal from a labor or commercial arbitration decision. 4   Falling between these two 
extremes is the judicial standard of review for internal decisions of private associations.   
 Three recent discipline cases arising under the collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) between the National Football League (NFL) and the NFL Players Association 
(NFLPA) make the point.  The NFLPA sought judicial review of disciplinary action taken 
by the NFL Commissioner against these players under the Commissioner’s broad power to 
take action to remedy conduct detrimental to the integrity of the game.5  The NFL CBA 
clearly expresses the parties’ explicit intent to remove Commissioner’s discipline for most 
                                                        
2 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1947); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 
(1947). 
 
3 See, e.g., Zachariah Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1014 
(1930) (suggesting the standard for judicial review of a private association as (i) the rules and proceedings 
must not be contrary to natural justice; (2) the expulsion must have been in accordance with the rules; (3) the 
proceedings must have been free from malice (bad faith)). 
Beyond the scope of this article is the choice of law question concerning the common law of private 
associations.  In some cases discussed in this article, the courts assume that a particular state’s common law 
applies.  See, e.g., Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Illinois law).  
Because judicial review of private association law is based primarily on adherence to the association’s 
constitution and by-laws, see text accompanying notes 26-33, infra, sports leagues can avoid lack-of-
uniformity problems by inserting a choice of law provision into their Constitution.  For an argument that 
federal courts could develop a federal common law regarding review of private associations for purposes of 
judicial review of managerial decisions to discipline workers outside the context of industrial arbitration, see 
note 112, infra. 
 
4  This limited judicial role in labor arbitrations was established in United Steelworkers of America v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).  Enterprise Wheel & Car was announced the same day 
as two other important decisions stressing the Court’s deference to impartial and independent labor 
arbitrators: United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) and 
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).  These three cases are referred 
to as the “Steelworkers Trilogy.”  See, e.g., AT&T Techs. v. Comm’s. Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 
648 (1986). 
 
5 NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d. Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Brady]; NFL Players 
Ass’n v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Peterson]; NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 874 F.3d 222 
(5th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Elliott CA5].   In a procedural move, the NFL in the latter case filed a motion to 
enforce an arbitral award, under the Labor and Management Relations Act, NFL Management Council v. 
NFL Players Ass’n, No. 17 Civ. 6761 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y.), where the parties turned to preliminary relief as 
well.  See slip op. (October 30, 2017) [hereinafter Elliott NY]. 
This “best interest” power applies to all members of the NFL: owners, employees, officials, and players. 
NFL, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NFL § 8.13(A) (1970) (Rev. 2006). To exercise the “best interest” 
power against a player, the Commissioner is constrained by the provisions of the 2011 NFL-CBA. See NFL 
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 46 (2011). 
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types of on-field conduct and for “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public 
confidence in, the game of football” from the detailed system of labor arbitration the parties 
use to resolve other disputes under the CBA.6  Nonetheless, as the Peterson, Brady, and 
Elliott cases demonstrate, the NFLPA routinely frames the motion to vacate in federal court 
under the very narrow standard appropriate to judicial review of an independent labor 
arbitrator.7  In our view, application of this narrow standard of judicial review is the wrong 
standard of review for Commissioner discipline against a player taken pursuant to Article 
46. 
 This is not just a technical distinction.  The choice of the wrong standard of review 
for Article 46 discipline has several ramifications.  First, to treat the Commissioner’s 
judgment as equivalent to the award by a labor arbitrator results in an unjustified anomaly.  
Courts review Commissioner discipline of team owners and other non-union league 
employees under the state law of private associations.8  However, when the Commissioner 
disciplines a union player, and the player exhausts his appeal right, the NFLPA has, to date, 
filed a motion for vacatur under labor arbitration standards.  As a result, the player is limited 
to a more narrow scope of judicial review than team owners or non-union employees for 
what could be the same or similar offense. 9  Second, perhaps more importantly, the 
                                                        
6 NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 43-46 (2011). Articles 43 and 44 of the NFL-CBA set 
forth a typical labor arbitration regime utilizing an independent arbitrator.  In contrast, Article 46, Section 
1(a) does not.  Article 46 provides that “[n]otwithstanding anything stated in Article 43... all disputes 
involving a fine or suspension for conduct on the playing field [except for distinctive procures for 
unnecessary roughness or unsportsmanlike conduct on the field] or involving action taken against a player 
by the Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of football, 
will be processed exclusively as follows . . . ” To summarize, the special process that ensues under Article 
46, the initial disciplinary hearing, is customarily held before the Commissioner; if the player elects to 
“appeal,” the player’s “appeal” is not to an independent arbitrator, but to a “hearing officer” designated by 
the Commissioner.  Often, as in Brady, the Commissioner serves as the hearing officer in review of his own 
decision. Brady, 820 F.3d 527. In other cases, like Peterson, the Commissioner designated the former NFL 
Vice President for Labor Relations, Harold Henderson, as the hearing officer. Peterson, 831 F.3d 985. In a 
recent disciplinary hearing, the Commissioner appointed a retired trial judge to hear the player appeal, as the 
Commissioner’s testimony was essential to the merits on appeal. Barbara S. Jones, In the Matter of Ray Rice 
(Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.espn.com/pdf/2014/1128/141128_rice-summary.pdf. For similar reasons, in 
the famous “Bountygate” discipline the Commissioner appointed the previous Commissioner, Paul 
Tagliabue, as the hearing officer to hear the players’ appeals. Paul Tagliabue, In the Matter of New Orleans 
Saints Pay-for Performance/ “Bounty” (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000109668/article/paul-tagliabues-full-decision-on-saints-bounty-
appeal.  
 
7 See NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d by Peterson, 831 F.3d 985 
(“[T]he NFLPA filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award under Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (LMRA) and Section10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (FAA).” 
The trial court, consistent with this petition, considered its standard of review under these two acts); See also 
NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d by Brady, 820 F.3d 
527 (the trial court stated that the NFLPA and NFL, on cross motions, argued their respective positions 
“pursuant to Section 301 of the [LMRA] and Section 10 of the [FAA].”), and Elliott CA 5, 874 F.3d 222 (slip 
op. at 2) (analyzing dispute under LMRA). 
 
8 See, e.g., NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 70, § 1 (the governing law for the NFL-CBA is 
New York). See discussion infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
9 See discussion infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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utilization of the wrong process distorts the law of labor arbitral review, presenting ongoing 
risks to that important body of law, which extends beyond the NFL.  A major issue in the 
most recent Elliott case concerned the NFLPA’s claim that the Commissioner’s discipline 
can be overturned if federal judges are persuaded that the procedures used fell short of the 
broad concept of “fundamental fairness.”10  If parties collectively bargain to exclude a 
management decision from review by an independent arbitrator, then judicial review 
should respect that clear statement of intent, and apply the law of private associations 
otherwise applicable to non-union individuals subject to the private association’s rules.11 
 The recent decisions involving famous NFL stars Adrian Peterson of the Minnesota 
Vikings, Tom Brady of the New England Patriots, and Ezekiel Elliott of the Dallas 
Cowboys illustrate the problem.  Each was disciplined by Commissioner Roger Goodell 
for misconduct under Article 46. The discipline was unsuccessfully appealed pursuant to 
internal appeal provisions specified in that Article.  In each of these cases, the NFLPA, on 
behalf of the player, sought judicial review under both section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA)12 and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),13 to vacate 
the “arbitration” decision by the Commissioner.  Consistent with the pleadings, the court 
opinions at both the district court and appeals court levels treated the cases as seeking 
judicial review of a disciplinary decision by a labor arbitrator.  Three district courts vacated 
the Commissioner’s discipline.14  The district judges, in rendering judgment, were clearly 
cognizant of the fact that the discipline under review was not that upheld by an independent 
expert arbitrator, but was discipline imposed and reviewed solely by a management 
executive.  Three appellate courts and one follow-on decision by a district judge reversed 
the district court decisions, based on the narrow guardrails imposed on judicial review by 
Steelworkers Trilogy.15  For example, the Second Circuit, in describing the Article 46 
                                                        
 
10 NFL Players Ass'n v. NFL, No. 4:17-CV-615 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 8, 2017) (hereinafter Elliott PI).  A similar 
critique of the Commissioner’s decision in the Brady case comes from an academic commentator.  See Anne 
M. Lofaso, Deflategate: What’s the Steelworkers Trilogy Got to Do with It?, 6 BERKELEY J. ENT. AND 
SPORTS L. 47 (2017), available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjesl/vol6/iss1/11, at 74 (opining 
Commissioner deprived Brady of “industrial due process”). 
 
11 See, e.g., Adam Rhodes, How Ezekiel Elliott's 2nd Circ. Case Could Upend Arbitration, Law 360 (Nov. 
13, 2017), available at https://www.law360.com/sports/articles/984382/how-ezekiel-elliott-s-2nd-circ-case-
could-upend-arbitration?nl_pk=b8322f18-889c-4abe-b5b2-
6e47f2229d11&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=sports. In the article, 
Professor Michael Leroy suggests that the expanded judicial review used by the district courts in the cases 
discussed here would adversely affect commercial arbitration, particularly in the securities area. 
 
12 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 185 (1947). 
 
13 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, (1947). 
 
14 Elliott PI, rev’d, NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 874 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2017); NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL 
Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 820 F.3d 527 (2d. Cir. 2016) (Brady); NFL 
Players Ass’n v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1092 (D. Minn. 2015) (Peterson), rev’d, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 
2016). 
15 Brady, 820 F.3d at 537; Peterson, 831 F.3d at 993-94 (2016); Elliott CA 5; Elliott NY.  See supra note 4 
(Steelworkers Trilogy). 
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appeal process, characterized it as an arbitration, even though the CBA, by its language, 
never places Article 46 discipline within the independent arbitrator paradigm. In the court’s 
words, “Brady requested arbitration and League Commissioner Roger Goodell, serving as 
arbitrator, entered an award confirming the discipline.”16 
 In our view, the standards specified in the LMRA and the FAA are not the correct 
standards for judges to review a decision expressly withdrawn from arbitration under the 
CBA. The district courts in Peterson, Brady and Elliott engaged in a strained application 
of these standards, in order to vacate the Commissioner’s “arbitral award,” and were 
reversed by the courts of appeals.  The application of these arbitration standards to review 
a matter of management discretion threatens the integrity of the arbitral process.  The 
collective bargaining agreement should be interpreted in the straightforward way, typical 
of non-sports agreements, where a matter is clearly removed from review by independent 
arbitration.  Stated differently, where the decision is removed from arbitration and left to 
management, then affected parties are left with the same rights as they would have in the 
absence of collective bargaining, under the common law.  To be sure, NFL owners and 
players are free to effectuate federal labor policy by altering this presumption, but they 
should be required to do so explicitly.17 
 The Article suggests that, when a matter is clearly removed from arbitration, the 
Steelworkers Trilogy and FAA standards for judicial review do not apply and reviewing 
courts should not apply those standards.  These standards are designed for independent 
expert arbitrators, not unilateral decisions by one of the parties to the agreement.  Absent 
text that explicitly incorporates these standards into the collective bargain, when the 
NFLPA and players seek review in federal court of an Article 46 disciplinary decision, they 
should plead for relief under the principles of judicial review that would apply under the 
law governing private associations.  This would conform the judicial review of the 
Commissioner’s decision to the same standards as review of discipline directed at an owner 
or non-union employee.   Applying the appropriate standard will not be outcome 
determinative in all cases.  However, it will focus the reviewing court on different questions 
and, in some cases, will give the courts broader leeway to overturn a decision.   Finally, 
this approach will not distort the standards of judicial review generally applicable to arbitral 
awards. 
 The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II lays out the common law baseline for 
judicial review of decisions by a sports league commissioner, in the absence of labor law 
and collective bargaining.  Precedents regarding sports leagues and similar associations 
hold that association officials enjoy wide discretion, but that courts will reverse actions that 
exceed delegated authority, are wholly lacking in evidence, are arbitrary or capricious, are 
tainted by fundamental procedural unfairness, or are contrary to established association 
rules. Part III sets forth the statutory overlay of labor law and its preference for arbitration, 
while emphasizing that the overarching policy of freedom of contract between unions and 
                                                        
 
16 Brady, 820 F.3d at 531; see supra note 6. 
 
17  NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 46. The review by the Commissioner of his own 
discipline under Article 46 has existed since the first NFL-CBA in 1968.  Even Professor Lofaso, supra note 
10, at 29, who is critical of Goodell’s decision, acknowledges that the parties did not bargain for Goodell to 
arbitrate the grievance (a key premise of Steelworkers Trilogy) but that they bargained “for discretion in cases 
that question the integrity of the game of football.” 
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management is not unlimited.  In Part IV, we apply these principles in the context of sports 
arbitration, with emphasis on the role of clear statement rules in interpreting both relevant 
statutes as well as collective bargains.  Part V articulates our thesis that specific principles 
of review of impartial labor arbitrators should not be applied to other forms of dispute 
resolution, particularly when the language in the collective bargaining agreement expressly 
excludes impartial arbitration of a management decision.  Rather, courts faced with 
disciplinary decisions that are withdrawn from impartial arbitration should review them, 
under their common law powers, either applying specific standards set forth in the 
collective bargaining agreement or applying the general standards for review that would 
be applicable to non-union employees or owners.  We discuss this approach to three recent 
sports disciplinary cases of team owners and non-union employees. 
 
II. THE COMMON LAW AND THE SPORTS LEAGUE COMMISSIONER 
 
At common law, absent specific language in a contract, employment is “at will.”  
Workers can quit at any time.  Employers can fire workers for any reason at any time.18 
 Employers and workers are, however, allowed to enter into enforceable contracts 
governing the terms of employment.  The contract can specify terms of discipline and 
grounds for dismissal, and provide each party with remedies in case of breach.   Disputes 
are resolved in civil litigation before judges.19  Significantly, on grounds of public policy, 
courts refused to enforce contract provisions that purport to waive access to courts to 
resolve disputes.20 
 Judicial review is circumscribed, however, when the dispute resolution is one 
designated by a private association21 based on agreement of its members.   Under the 
common law of private association, where the organization’s rules provide for internal 
resolution of disputes, judicial review is limited.  Courts do retain the authority to reverse 
an association officers’ decision if the decision: (a) exceeds delegated authority, (b) lacks 
any evidence in support, or (c) is contrary to the association’s by-laws or rules; (d) was 
motivated by malice or bad faith; (e) was arbitrary; or (f) is contrary to public policy.22  
Judicial review of private association decisions varies based on the nature of the particular 
                                                        
18  William M. Howard, Annotation, Common-Law Retaliatory Discharge of Employee for Refusing to 
Perform or Participate in Unlawful or Wrongful Acts, 104 A.L.R.5th 1 (2002). 
 
19 See Id. 
 
20 See, e.g., Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979). 
 
21 Examples of private associations are social organizations (such as fraternal organizations), ecclesiastical 
organizations (such as churches, synagogues, or mosques) or business associations (such as medical groups 
or homeowners associations). 
 
22 See Chafee, supra note 3 at 1001, for support for items (a)-(c). As discussed in items (d)-(f), other grounds 
for reversing these decisions can include an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law, as in Montes v. 
Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997); an award that is arbitrary, capricious or an results 
from an abuse of discretion, Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1993); or an 
award that violates public policy, E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 531 U.S. 57 
(2000) and Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, supra, note 20. 
 
7 
 
 
organization and the degree of harm arising from discipline or expulsion.23  Significantly, 
where an association exercises a degree of control in an industry to preclude those 
subjected to discipline from engaging in their chosen profession, review is significantly 
closer than where the discipline is from a fraternal or social organization,24 where the 
plaintiff can choose to affiliate with other private associations, and where the defendant’s 
interest in choosing with whom to associate is greater.25    
 The common law of private associations recognizes an exception from the doctrine 
of judicial deference regarding the decisions of a private voluntary association where the 
challenged action violates the association’s own bylaws or constitution.26  Courts avoid 
intervening in the merits of private association disputes, but will carefully review 
adherence to their own rules.  For example, in Smith v. Kern County Medical Association,27 
the California Supreme Court upheld Dr. Smith’s expulsion from the association for 
engaging in the “unethical” conduct of continuing to serve patients at the county hospital.  
This was objectionable because other members of the association were pressuring the 
hospital to limit their service to indigent patients so that private hospitals could serve those 
able to pay.  Without considering whether Dr. Smith’s actions were “unethical” in any 
objective sense of the term, the Court agreed that his actions were “unethical” as defined 
in association rules, and his expulsion was procedurally correct.  In contrast, in the Cal 
State (Hayward) case, the court of appeals affirmed a preliminary injunction against the 
NCAA for declaring a Pioneer athlete ineligible, concluding that the equities favored the 
university and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judicial determination as to whether the 
decision contravened NCAA rules and authoritative interpretations of the rules on which 
the university relied.28 
 Procedurally, courts will also reverse private association decisions, “particularly 
one that affects the member’s economic interests,” where the association deprives a 
member of “notice of the basis for the proposed expulsion and a fair opportunity for the 
member to respond to the charges.”29  Clearly summarizing this law, a recent state trial 
judge observed that courts will protect individuals from arbitrary decisions by private 
associations when these decisions affect “tangible economic benefits,” and this review 
                                                        
 
23 Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc’y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 196 (1960). 
 
24 Id. at 199. 
 
25 Thus, even a breach of the association’s own rules may not secure judicial relief for private clubs where 
the associational interest is great and the plaintiff’s injury was largely to status rather than tangible economic 
benefits.  See, e.g., Rutledge v. Gulian, 459 A.2d 680, 685 (N.J. 1983) (rejecting challenge to discipline by 
Masonic Order for technical violation of internal procedural rules). 
 
26 California State Univ., Hayward v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85, 88-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1975), citing Sweetman v. Barrows, 161 N.E. 272 (Mass. 1928); Most Worshipful United Grand Lodge, etc., 
v. Lee, 96 Atl. 872 (Md. 1916). 
 
27 Smith v. Kern County Med. Ass’n, 120 P.2d 874 (Cal. 1942). 
 
28 Cal State (Hayward), 121 Cal. Rptr. at 89. 
 
29 Cipriani Builders, Inc. v. Madden, 912 A.2d 152, 161 (N.J. App. Div. 2006). 
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includes decisions that violate public policy “but also if the procedures the association 
followed in making that decision were fundamentally unfair.”30  The California Supreme 
Court has developed an entire body of common law for disciplinary action taken by private 
associations where “certain private entities possess substantial power either to thwart an 
individual's pursuit of a lawful trade or profession, or to control the terms and conditions 
under which it is practiced.”31 
 An illustrative case is James v. National Arts Club,32 a heated dispute between a 
club’s board of governors and its former president.  Pursuant to its bylaws, the board served 
James with a statement of charges.  James secured an injunction to stay the hearing, and a 
subsequent judicial order disqualifying certain board members from presiding over the 
hearing.  After James was expelled from the club, the trial court overturned the decision, 
disqualified board members the judge found to be biased from presiding over the hearing, 
and appointed a neutral arbiter.  The appellate court reversed.  First, it found that the lower 
court erred in failing to wait until the club’s internal proceedings were completed with a 
full record.  Second, the allegations of bias were insufficient: the plaintiff must provide “a 
factual demonstration to support the allegation of bias and proof that the outcome flowed 
from it.”33 This holding is significant because private association rules will often designate 
an arbiter who would not meet the standards of impartiality required of an independent 
arbitrator. 
 Major American professional sports are organized as private associations 
comprised of the member clubs that participate in the competition. 34   Each of these 
associations has a governing document, called a league constitution.  All major 
professional sports follow the model created by baseball in the 1920s, which created the 
office of the Commissioner, elected by the owners with significant job security, and granted 
him (to date, always a man) broad powers to take actions with regard to any conduct 
detrimental to the “best interests” of the game.35  Distinctively from this “best interests” 
power, league constitutions also provide that the Commissioner “shall have full, complete, 
and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate” disputes between stakeholders within the 
                                                        
30 Levin v. Bd. of Trustees of Ocean Cty. Bus. Ass'n, No. A-5596-11T2, 2013 WL 764685 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Mar. 1, 2013). 
 
31 Ezekial v. Winkley, 572 P.2d 32, 35 (Cal. 1977). 
 
32 James v. Nat’l Arts Club, 952 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y.App. Div. 2012). 
 
33 Id. at 160 (citing Matter of Warder v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 423 N.E.2d 352 (N.Y. 
1981). 
 
34 The principal exception is NASCAR, a private company that organizes the premier stock car racing 
competition, where racing teams have separate “vertical” contracts.  See generally STEPHEN F. ROSS & 
STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE WORLD, UNITE! A (CAPITALIST) MANIFESTO FOR SPORTS CONSUMERS 70-
107 (2008). Technically, the NHL is a 501(c)(6) tax-exempt organization.  The NFL was also a 501(c)(6) 
until 2014, when it abandoned that classification and became an unincorporated association.  Major League 
Baseball opted to forego its 501(c)(6) status in 2007.   
 
35 See ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (2000) (explaining 
the origin of the league constitution). As such, the NFL Constitutional delegation is typical. NFL, 
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NFL, art. VIII, § 8.13(A) (1970) (Rev. 2006). 
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league.36  This reflects the unique role of the commissioner of sports league.  Discipline 
regarding the integrity or the “best interests” of the entire sport must be industry-wide, not 
just for a single employer.  History has shown the need for a single commissioner with 
regard to special integrity needs of sporting competitions.37 The arbitration power reflects 
related but distinct concerns about providing a quick, efficient non-judicial system for 
resolving internal disputes.38 
 Two sports cases illustrate and apply these principles.  Finley v. Kuhn39 was a 
challenge to a decision by the Commissioner of Baseball disapproving three agreements 
whereby the Oakland Athletics sold the contracts of three star players to the New York 
Yankees and the Boston Red Sox.  The court upheld the decision as within the 
Commissioner’s broad authority to take action to prevent conduct “inconsistent with the 
best interests of baseball.”  As to this judgment, the court was extremely deferential.  The 
court explained that baseball “cannot be analogized to any other business” and standards 
like “the best interests of baseball” were not “familiar to courts and obviously require some 
expertise in their application.”40  
 The Seventh Circuit expressly considered a provision in the Major League 
Agreement that provides that all clubs agreed to be bound by the Commissioner’s decision 
and to waive recourse to courts.  However, it refused to read the provision literally. Instead, 
the court applied Illinois law. 41  That law conforms to well-recognized principles of 
deference under the law of private associations.  The court ruled that: 
 
[T]he waiver of recourse clause contested here seems to add little if 
anything to the common law non-reviewability of private association 
actions. This clause can be upheld as coinciding with the common law 
standard disallowing court interference. We view its inclusion in the Major 
League Agreement merely as a manifestation of the intent of the contracting 
parties to insulate from review decisions made by the Commissioner 
                                                        
36 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NFL, art. VIII, § 8.13(A). 
 
37 Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner and an Alternative 
Approach From a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 70 (1995). 
 
38 See id. at 77. 
 
39 Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 
40 Id. at 537. 
 
41 See note 3, supra, regarding choice of law issues.  As the court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity, it 
faced a decision as to choice of applicable state law. The original Major League Agreement was signed in 
Chicago in 1921, so Illinois seemed the appropriate choice.  The court then commented as follows on the 
applicable law: “Oakland has urged us to apply the substantive law dealing with the “policies and rules of a 
private association” to the Major League Agreement and actions taken thereunder. Illinois has developed a 
considerable body of law dealing with the activities of private voluntary organizations and we agree that the 
validity and effect of the waiver of recourse clause should initially be tested under these decisions.” Charles 
O. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 543.     
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concerning the subject matter of actions taken in accordance with his grant 
of powers.42  
 
Thus, the court further reasoned, the clause does not foreclose access to courts under all 
circumstances.  Exceptions to judicial deference exist: 
  
1) where the rules, regulations or judgments of the association are in 
contravention to the laws of the land or in disregard of the charter or bylaws 
of the association, or  
2) where the association has failed to follow the basic rudiments of due 
process of law. 43 
 
Indeed, the court specifically considered and rejected, as lacking sufficient evidence, 
Finley’s claim that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, or motivated by “malice, ill 
will, or anything other than the Commissioner’s good faith judgment that these attempted 
[contract] assignments were not in the best interests of baseball.”44  
 The distinction between impartial arbitration and judicial review under the law of 
private association is also illustrated by Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn 
(“Turner”).45   One of the responsibilities of sports league commissioners is to enforce 
standards against “tampering” with players still under contract to other clubs.   Baseball 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn found that Atlanta Braves owner Ted Turner had violated this 
standard and imposed sanctions.  Subsequently, at a cocktail party with media present, 
Turner told San Francisco Giants’ owner Bob Lurie that the Braves would outbid the Giants 
for the services of star centerfielder Gary Matthews.  Eventually, Matthews signed with the 
Braves.   After a hearing, Commissioner Kuhn found that Turner’s repeated violation of 
tampering rules was “not in the best interests of baseball.”  After another hearing, Kuhn 
imposed sanctions against the Atlanta club, including suspending Turner for one year and 
denying the Braves its first pick in the following summer’s amateur draft.  
 As in Finley, the judge in Turner refused to read the waiver-of-recourse clause in 
the Major League Agreement as precluding any judicial review.   Of particular relevance 
to this Article, the court expressly rejected the claim that the standard for judicial review 
of an arbitrator’s decision under the Federal Arbitration Act was applicable to Kuhn’s 
decision.46  
 The court observed that the Commissioner’s disciplinary powers were grounded in 
one provision of the Major League Agreement, whilst the Commissioner’s authority to 
resolve all “disputes and controversies related in any way to professional baseball between 
                                                        
42 Charles O. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 543 (emphasis added). 
 
43 Id. at 544. 
 
44 Id. at 539 n.44. 
 
45 Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
 
46 Id. at 1218. 
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clubs” is contained in a separate provision.47 Prior precedent supported the claim that the 
Commissioner’s arbitral authority did not apply where the dispute was a disciplinary one 
generated by the Commissioner himself under his “best interest” powers.   This distinction 
is well-illustrated by the Commissioner’s decision.  Had the Commissioner ordered the 
Braves to pay the Giants a sum of money, or assigned a player’s contract to the Giants, or 
given a Braves’ draft pick to the Giants, then the decision would seem akin to an arbitral 
award between two disputants.  Instead, by suspending Turner and simply taking away a 
draft pick, the decision was clearly of a punitive nature by the Commissioner in the exercise 
of his “best interests” authority.48 
 Turning to the merits of the case, the court upheld the Commissioner’s 
determination that Turner’s conduct was “tampering” and contrary to the “best interests of 
baseball.” The sanction of suspension was within the Commissioner’s discretion under the 
Major League Agreement.49  However, the court found the Major League Agreement’s 
provisions concerning penalties did not include loss of a draft pick, and given the penal 
nature of the clause, it was to be strictly construed.50   
 Another well-known baseball case illustrates the now-accepted principle that sports 
league commissioner decisions are subject to judicial review for failure to follow internal 
rules.  In Rose v. Giamatti,51 the specific question presented was whether federal courts 
had diversity jurisdiction over the Commissioner’s lifetime ban on the Cincinnati Reds’ 
legendary infielder for gambling on baseball games.  In concluding that the dispute was 
between the player and the commissioner, and that the Reds (like Rose, a citizen of Ohio) 
were not a real party to the case, the court emphasized that all parties agreed that the merits 
of the dispute turned on whether the Commissioner had followed his own procedural rules 
for handling investigations into claims that those subject to his jurisdiction engaged in 
conduct detrimental to the best interests of baseball.  The court observed: 
 
In short, Rose's controversy is not with Major League Baseball, but is with 
the office of the Commissioner of Baseball for the Commissioner's alleged 
failure to follow his own procedural rules in conducting the investigation 
of Rose's alleged gambling activities. Clearly, complete relief can be 
afforded with regard to the primary relief sought in the complaint -- 
preventing Commissioner Giamatti from conducting a disciplinary hearing 
-- without the need for any order against Major League Baseball or its 
constituent major league professional baseball clubs.52 
 
                                                        
47 Id. at 1219. 
 
48 Kuhn did not void the contract between the Braves and Matthews as part of his discipline.  In the authors’ 
opinion, to do so would have violated the 1976 MLB CBA granting eligible players’ unrestricted free agency 
rights.  Matthews had played no role in the tampering by Turner.     
 
49 Major League Agreement, Article 2, section 3. 
 
50 Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. 432 F. Supp. at 1225. 
 
51 Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989). 
52 Id. at 918-19. 
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In sum, under the common law of private associations, sports league commissioners enjoy 
wide discretion to define what constitutes the “best interests” of the sport.   However, courts 
retain the power of judicial review over commissioners’ decisions that exceed their 
delegated authority, are wholly lacking in evidence, are contrary to established league 
rules, or those that are arbitrary and capricious. 
 Based on these precedents, consider what might have occurred if New England 
Patriots’ executive Jonathan Kraft (son of owner Robert Kraft), rather than NFLPA 
member Tom Brady, had been the one personally subjected to the Commissioner’s 
discipline for the alleged deflation of game balls.  Judicial review of Commissioner 
Goodell’s decision in such a case would have been under private association standards, 
whereas the courts reviewed Brady’s Article 46 discipline under the traditional standards 
governing labor arbitrations.53  However, absent clear language in a CBA, as is the case 
with Article 46 -- why should a player be more limited in his rights to judicial review of 
discipline than a non-union employee or owner? 
 
III. THE STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL PREFERENCE FOR INDEPENDENT 
ARBITRATION OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 
 
Professional sports athletes followed non-sports employees in taking advantage of 
the National Labor Relations Act to organize collectively.54  As players in the NHL, NBA, 
and MLB organized to strengthen their bargaining position regarding wages and working 
conditions, one of their top priorities was to secure a collective bargaining agreement that 
permitted an independent labor arbitrator to resolve disputes between players and their 
employers, or with the commissioner. 55 Under the labor model for these three leagues, the 
substantive “law” was the CBA, not the league constitution, and the dispute resolution 
mechanism was impartial arbitration, not the law of private association that designates the 
Commissioner as the tribune.  Under these CBAs, federal law governing arbitration, rather 
than the law of private association, now governs most sports labor disputes in these three 
leagues. 
 The NFL bargaining history is different.  Since its first CBA in 1968, the 
independent arbitration model has been utilized in most aspects of dispute resolution.  The 
express exception is the Commissioner’s exercise of the “best interest” power.  In that case, 
as stated earlier, the Commissioner initially imposes the discipline; if the player elects to 
                                                        
 
53 See discussion infra, notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
 
54 The first players’ union certified by the NLRB was the NFLPA in 1970, following the assertion of 
jurisdiction by the NLRB over professional league sports in American League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs, 180 NLRB No. 30 (1969).  
 
55 For example, the use of an independent arbitrator was included in the MLB CBA in 1972.  The provision 
went relatively unnoticed by the owners.  Ironically, in 1975 the players’ right to take the 
Messersmith/McNally free-agency grievance before that arbitrator changed baseball forever. 
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“appeal” that discipline, his recourse is to a hearing officer designated by the 
Commissioner.  The hearing officer is frequently the Commissioner himself.56  
 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
  
Under the common law, agreements to waive recourse to courts were generally 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.57   To facilitate the concept of neutral arbitration 
as an alternative means of dispute resolution, in 1925 Congress enacted the FAA.58   For 
contracts subject to regulation under Congress’ interstate commerce power, the FAA 
validates agreements to submit disputes to binding arbitration, superseding state laws to 
the contrary.    
 The FAA’s theoretical foundation is that parties otherwise competent to make 
binding promises are free to make a bargain to abide by the decision of an arbitrator.59 
Thus, when a judge reviews an arbitral award, the award itself is presumptively the decision 
of the parties.  Consider a sports illustration: The provision in the Major League Baseball 
(MLB) collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate certain players’ salaries.60   Although 
an arbitration-eligible player and his club did not agree on the salary, the salary awarded 
by the arbitrator is understood to reflect the decision of the parties, and becomes part of the 
employment contract. 
 The FAA provides important but narrow exceptions.  Section 10 provides a federal 
court may vacate an award under any of the following provisions: 
  
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators . . . 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone 
the hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party 
have been prejudiced; or 
                                                        
56 Compare NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 43 (2011) with art. 46; see supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
 
57 See supra note 30. 
 
58 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
 
59 Legislative history reinforces this conclusion.  
The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless there is in it 
a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it ought not to be 
enforced. This exists only when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or 
when the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers or were influenced by 
other undue means- cases in which enforcement would obviously be unjust. There is no 
authority and no opportunity for the court, in connection with the award, to inject its own 
ideas of what the award should have been. 
See S. Rep. No. 68-536 (1924). 
 
60  See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. VI, § E, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. 
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(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.61 
 
The presumptive validity of arbitral agreements set the stage for their primacy in resolution 
of industrial labor disputes.  Indeed, courts have acknowledged that the FAA’s principles 
are generally incorporated into labor arbitration, although the process has been not entirely 
smooth. 62 
 
B. The Labor Management Relations Act and the Steelworkers Trilogy  
 
Congress federalized labor policy towards collective bargaining with the passage of the 
National Labor Relations Act in 1935.  In the 1947 amendment to the Act (LMRA), 
Congress sought to improve the process for dispute resolution.63   A critical provision in 
this regard, section 301, conferred subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts.  This change 
replaced state common law contract rules with a federal common law to enforce and 
interpret collective bargaining agreements.64  CBAs generally displace the doctrine of 
                                                        
61 9 U.S.C. § 10.  See also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (suggesting that “manifest disregard for the 
law” is a ground for overturning an arbitration decision); see also Hall Street Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
552 U.S. 576 (2008) (holding that parties may not expand by agreement on the standards of review specified 
in the FAA). 
 
62 See Lisa M. Eaton, Arbitration Agreements in Labor and Employment Contracts: Well Within the Reach 
of the FAA, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 193, 212 (2002); See also Michael LeRoy, Irreconciliable Differences:  The 
Troubled Marriage of Judicial Review Standards under the Steelworkers Trilogy and the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2010). There is some debate whether the FAA was intended to apply to labor 
arbitration, turning particularly on the exclusionary language in section 1 stating “ . . . nothing herein 
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.” See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
127 (2001) (rejecting this theory). 
Because this Article contrasts the standards of review in labor arbitration used in several sports cases with 
the standards for review of decisions under the law of private association, the FAA’s standards of review are 
only relevant to the discussion in this Article insofar as they are incorporated into the standards used by 
federal judges to review labor arbitrations.  Because the LMRA does not explicitly specify the standard of 
judicial review (in contrast to the earlier adopted FAA), any commercial arbitration standards applicable to 
labor arbitration exist by virtue of common law reasoning of federal courts implementing the LMRA.  The 
Texas district court in Elliott granted relief to the NFLPA, see note 10 supra, in part because he concluded 
that the “arbitrator” (the NFL executive designated by the commissioner to hear an appeal lieu of impartial 
arbitration) had acted contrary to § 10(a)(3) of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3), “in refusing to hear evidence 
pertinent and material to the controversy.”  In contrast, the Second Circuit in Brady observed that it had 
“never held that the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness’ applies to arbitration awards under the LMRA.” 
Brady II, 820 F.3d at 553 n.13. 
 
63 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947). 
 
64 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry. . . , or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any 
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in 
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”).  
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employment of will at common law, thus affording workers greater job security than non-
unionized workers whose employment is not secured by an individually negotiated 
contract.   Most important for our purposes, section 203(d) of the LMRA is a statutory 
declaration that the “desirable method for settlement of grievances” under a CBA is a “final 
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties.”65  
 The Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in three cases commonly referred to as 
the Steelworkers Trilogy provides the authoritative interpretation of these provisions.  The 
Court interpreted the LMRA to create two clear doctrines.  First, in United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., the Court held that federal judges must defer to the parties’ 
choice of alternative dispute resolution procedures.66  Second, in United Steelworkers v. 
American Manufacturing Co., 67  the Court held that, where the parties have chosen 
impartial arbitration, federal judges must enforce awards that “draw their essence from the 
contract.”  This second holding reflected the reality that of all the many promises parties 
make in a CBA, the most important one is that all disputes are determined by an arbitrator 
of their choice, and not by federal judges.   
 In explaining these holdings, the Court went significantly further than was required 
to implement the congressional declaration to effectuate grievance settlement “by a method 
agreed upon by the parties.” 68   It discussed at length the many benefits to labor, 
management, and the general public of the impartial arbitrator.69  An arbitral tribunal has 
greater expertise than federal judges in interpreting a CBA to reflect the parties’ agreement 
and to facilitate the parties’ ongoing relationship.   In addition, labor arbitration promotes 
labor peace.  It is quicker and less expensive than federal court litigation, and the parties 
are more likely to move forward constructively after a decision by an arbitrator of their 
choice.   As Justice Douglas observed, whereas arbitration in effect substitutes for litigation 
in commercial disputes, in labor disputes it often substitutes for strikes and lockouts.70  
 
These standards are premised on a fundamental policy assumption concerning the 
independence, neutrality and expertise of the arbitrator.71  For example, Justice Douglas 
states in the Enterprise Wheel opinion:   
                                                        
 
65 See id. § 173(d) (“Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is 
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or 
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.”). 
 
66 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (reversing lower 
court’s refusal to defer to arbitrator regarding a non-meritorious claim). 
 
67 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (reversing lower court’s set-
aside of an arbitral award because of its disagreement with the merits of the arbitrator’s decision). 
 
68 29 U.S.C. § 173. 
 
69 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-82 (1960). 
 
70 Id. at 578. 
71 None of the three Steelworkers opinions refers to the Federal Arbitration Act, nor addresses the question 
whether the standards under section 10 under that act are congruent with the subjective standards articulated 
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When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective 
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order 
to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes 
to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide 
variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what 
specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.72 
 
To implement this rationale, the Court adopted a clear statement rule to enforce the first of 
their clear doctrines established in Warrior & Gulf: arbitration is enforced, unless the 
parties “evince a most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from 
arbitration.”73   The Court’s adoption of this clear statement rule is important.   This holding 
is not consistent with a strict and literal reading of section 203(d).   Consider a CBA that 
contains ambiguous language regarding whether certain disputes may not be subject to 
arbitration.  Literally, the statutory command for a federal judge to implement the method 
of dispute resolution “agreed to by the parties” would require the judge, in cases of 
ambiguous text, to explore other evidence of the parties’ intent, and enforce the method 
which the judge determines is most probably the parties’ choice.   However, Steelworkers 
                                                        
in Steelworkers.  The two cases that are the centerpiece for this article, Peterson and Brady, utilize both 
Steelworkers and the FAA interchangeably.  The district court in Peterson recognized the issue, and stated:   
 
For purposes of this case, the standard of review under the LMRA and the FAA is the same. 
Courts give decisions by labor arbitrators “substantial deference.” “The federal labor laws 
‘reflect a decided preference for private settlement of labor disputes.’ ” Therefore, “as long 
as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the [CBA] and acting within the 
scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice 
to overturn his decision.”  
 
Compare National Football League Player’s Ass’n v. National Football League, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1089 
(D. Minn. 2015) (Peterson) with Oxford Health Systems v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (“Here, 
Oxford invokes § 10(a)(4) of the Act, which authorizes a federal court to set aside an arbitral award “where 
the arbitrator[ ] exceeded [his] powers.”) (suggesting the standards under both are essentially the same, even 
in a non-labor arbitration). A party seeking relief under that provision bears a heavy burden. Id. at 2068 (“It 
is not enough ... to show that the [arbitrator] committed an error—or even a serious error.”). Because the 
parties “bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement,” an arbitral decision “even arguably 
construing or applying the contract” must stand, regardless of a court's view of its (de)merits.” Id. at 2068.   
Only if the arbitrator acts outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority, issuing an award that 
“simply reflect[s][his] own notions of [economic] justice” rather than “draw[ing] its essence from the 
contract”, may a court overturn his determination.  Id. at 2068 (quoting United Paperworkers Intern. Union, 
AFL-CIO v, Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing 
or applying the contract and acting within the scope his authority, that a court is convinced he committed 
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”)). The Court emphasized that “the sole question for 
us is whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties' contract, not whether he got its meaning 
right or wrong.”  Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2068. 
 
72 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
 
73 Id. at 585. 
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Trilogy instead instructs judges to forego this inquiry and find a matter to be arbitrable 
unless the parties have clearly stated that it is precluded. 
 To further the second clear statement doctrine, established in Enterprise Wheel & 
Car Co., the Court held that judicial challenges to arbitral awards would be narrowly 
circumscribed.  To secure judicial relief, parties would need to demonstrate that the award 
disregarded the “essence” of the parties’ collective bargain in favor of the arbitrator’s “own 
brand of industrial justice,”74 or that the award was “affirmative misconduct” of the sort 
that would justify the setting aside of a commercial arbitration award under section 10(c) 
of the FAA.75  Alas, lower courts continue to ignore the Court’s instructions to restrain 
their impulse to second-guess impartial arbitrators,76 even though, as a court of appeals 
correctly interpreted Steelworkers Trilogy, awards cannot be set aside because the 
arbitrator “erred in interpreting the contract” or “clearly erred” or “grossly erred,” as long 
as they actually interpreted the CBA.77 
 
C. Limits to freedom of contract   
 
A fundamental principle of labor relations law is the ability of an employer and the 
workers’ chosen union to choose to fashion an agreement on wages, hours, and working 
conditions. Logic and experience suggest that the congressional policy promoting 
regulation of labor through collective bargaining is more easily achieved when parties are 
allowed to bargain themselves.  External limitations on the freedom of contract can require 
the parties to forego the most efficient bargain.   Because external limitations can increase 
the difficulty of coming to an agreement, they can also increase the likelihood of impasses, 
strikes and lockouts. 78     
 
There are, however, many exceptions to this important foundational principle.  Union 
and management cannot agree to waive rights that workers have under related federal 
employment laws, such as minimum wage and maximum hour requirements, and 
                                                        
74  Id. at 597. 
 
75 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987) ("procedural" questions which 
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are to be left to the arbitrator).  Misco observed that 
the FAA may not directly apply to labor arbitration, but applied that standard in the exercise of the Court’s 
power to shape a federal common law for labor arbitration.  Id. n.9.  Still, Misco’s highly deferential attitude 
toward independent labor arbitrators, see note 71 supra, provides reasons for a court to be hesitant in 
importing “fundamental fairness” concerns from the FAA into labor arbitrations reviewed under the LMRA. 
For starters, the very context of § 301’s jurisdictional grant over cases involving “contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization,” suggests that courts should not superimpose an extracontractual 
definition of “fairness” in arbitrations beyond the actual standards and procedures for which the parties 
bargained. 
 
76  ROBERT A. GORMAN AND MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING § 25.1, 817 (2d ed. 2004). 
 
77 Hill v. Norfolk & West. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 
78 Wood v. National Basketball Association, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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occupational health and safety regulations.79  There are likely many examples of industrial 
bargains that could be facilitated if unions were able to waive specific safety standards (the 
union considers unessential to its particular industry) in exchange for other, favorable, 
management concessions. The inability to negotiate conditions guaranteed to workers 
under federal law precludes this possibility.  Federal labor law also precludes unions from 
reaching agreements that breach the union’s duty of fair representation to all workers in 
the bargaining unit.  
 Additional exceptions have been created by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) in the exercise of its delegated discretion to effectuate the statutory requirement 
that parties bargain “in good faith.”   One example that directly limits freedom of contract 
is the doctrine regarding creation and termination of multi-employer bargaining.  The 
Supreme Court has upheld Board decisions that, when parties have voluntarily agreed to 
commence bargaining on a multi-employer basis, neither the union nor individual 
employers can withdraw until the end of a “bargaining cycle.”80   For example, in the 
leading Board precedent, the parties were at an impasse with possible industrial action and 
the union shifted their approach by reaching a satisfactory agreement with one of the four 
employers with whom it was negotiating. Finding that the union withdrawal was “a sincere 
abandonment, with relative permanency, of the multiemployer unit and the embracement 
of a different course of bargaining on an individual-employer basis,” the Board held that 
the agreement could not be concluded until an appropriate time in the negotiation.81  
 In sum, although labor law generally seeks to fulfill the mutual aims of labor and 
management, there are multiple exceptions that may preclude or impair this goal.  In some 
cases, freedom of contract is explicitly limited, sometimes it is implicitly limited, and in 
other cases, such as the Steelworkers Trilogy, freedom of contract is supplemented by the 
requirement of clear statement.  If the parties fail to state their intent clearly with respect 
to arbitration, the presumption is in favor of arbitration. 
 
D. Implication of Steelworkers: The independent integrity of the arbitral process. 
 
The body of precedent, beginning with the path making decisions of the Steelworkers 
Trilogy, makes clear that judicial interpretation favoring labor arbitration is driven by 
policies that the Supreme Court favors and perceives are shared by Congress and the 
NLRB.  As Professor Roger I. Abrams has argued, “freedom to operate without legal 
intrusion but with considerable legal support devolves upon the participants  -- union, 
management, and arbitrators -- a responsibility to ensure that labor arbitration effectuates 
national policy.”82   Because federal courts will enforce no-strike promises in collective 
bargains and will not substantively review the correctness of an arbitral award, Abrams 
                                                        
 
79 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1985) (“Clearly, § 301 does not grant the 
parties to a [CBA] the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law.”). 
 
80 Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982) (citing with approval Retail Associates, 
Inc., 120 N. L. R. B. 388 (1958)). 
 
81 Retail Associates, 120 N.L.R.B. at 394. 
82 Roger I. Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 MICH. L. REV. 231, 235 (1977). 
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observes that because “the courts and the streets now foreclosed, the contract rights of the 
working person must find protection in the forum of arbitration or be lost.”83  
 In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that a final and 
binding arbitration award is vulnerable if tainted by the breach of the union’s duty of fair 
representation to its workers.  The Court reasoned that where "contractual processes have 
been seriously flawed," the "integrity of the arbitral process" has been undermined.   The 
Court reasoned that although Congress “has put its blessing on private dispute settlement 
arrangements provided in collective agreements,” it presumed “that contractual machinery 
would operate within some minimum levels of integrity."84   As Abrams notes, this holding 
means that the “preferred status of labor arbitration is thus not immutable.”85   He suggests 
that courts can easily impose core principles of arbitral integrity under the federal common 
law of labor arbitration established by section 301 of the LMRA.86  
 The Court clearly favors arbitration for reasons other than a commitment to laissez 
faire freedom of contract.  A libertarian approach would overturn the common law entirely 
and permit parties to simply waive access to courts in lieu of impartial arbitration.  Such 
an approach would direct courts to enforce the apparent intent of the parties, rather than 
presuming that the parties intended to resolve disputes before an impartial arbitrator absent 
clear evidence to the contrary.  The Court does not follow such a course.  Instead, the 
Steelworkers Trilogy articulates the substantive benefits of independent arbitration that 
warrant legislative, administrative, and judicial support.  These benefits include the fact 
that the arbitrator, as the chosen instrument of the parties, is controlled by their agreement 
and no other forces.   The Court recognized that goals of collective bargaining and labor 
peace are served when union and management can rely on an arbitrator’s “informed 
practical solution of a dispute they could not resolve themselves.” 87   Another significant 
benefit of independent arbitration is that parties tend to view the totality of arbitral 
decisions and conclude that they are acceptably based on the terms to which they agreed.  
 Of course, parties often agree to withdraw a matter from impartial arbitration, using 
clear language to do so.  A common practice is to make clear that a matter otherwise subject 
to arbitration will instead be reserved as a matter of management discretion (or, in certain 
context, union discretion).   Occasionally, in an extreme form of Justice Brandeis’ insight 
that it is more important for a matter to be settled than settled correctly,88 unsuccessful 
mediation efforts conclude with a coin flip.   In some contexts, the parties recognize that 
maintaining the overall labor relationship outweighs a process to achieve the correct result 
in individual cases, resulting in a specialized tribunal equally divided between management 
                                                        
 
83 Id. at 236. 
 
84 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976). 
 
85 Abrams, supra note 82, at 235.   
 
86 Id. at 263. 
 
87 Id. at 236.   
88 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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and labor, who are expected to resolve multiple industrial disputes through bargaining and 
accommodation.89  
 Although courts recognize the benefits of impartial arbitration, other policies 
supporting freedom of contract permit parties to a collective bargain, if they choose, to 
reject these general principles.  Parties are thus free to agree to resolve disputes by means 
other than impartial arbitration.  But because impartial arbitration serves these worthy 
values, the parties must state their intent to preclude arbitration clearly and unequivocally. 
 
IV. THE ROLE OF CLEAR STATEMENT IN SPORTS ARBITRATION 
 
In 1976, a sports arbitral award in the Messersmith/McNally case90 transformed both 
baseball, and eventually modern labor relations in sports.  The award ended a decades-long 
agreement among baseball owners not to compete for the services of players at the 
expiration of their contract.   Both the decision by a veteran arbitrator and the limited 
judicial review of that decision by federal courts demonstrate the role that clear statement 
rules serve in labor relations.  Two conclusions are inescapable: these rules largely preserve 
the ability of collective bargaining participants to craft results they want if they use 
language that is sufficiently clear, and judicially-created rules of clear statement allow 
judges to favor certain results and disfavor others. 
 For many years, MLB players were bound perpetually to the team with whom they 
had signed their initial contract, based on the owners’ understanding of language in the 
collectively bargained uniform player contract explicitly stating that the Club “may renew 
this contract for the period of one year on the same terms.”  In the Messersmith/McNally 
decision, the union challenged this interpretation, and the arbitrator interpreted the contract 
to preclude the repeated exercise of this renewal right.   As a result, after one year, the 
player was completely free to receive competing bids from all other baseball clubs.  The 
arbitrator largely relied on a principle requiring clear and express language to that effect, 
if the option clauses were to be perpetual. 91   
  This radical departure from past practice would not have been achieved had the 
arbitrator instead relied on techniques of contract interpretation primarily designed to 
achieve the most likely intent of the parties.  The literal language supported the owners’ 
interpretation that the right could be perpetually exercised by the club.  Prior practice 
suggested that the parties understood the contract to permit perpetual renewals, as 
evidenced by antitrust litigation funded by the players’ association that had challenged 
what was alleged as an owners’ agreement to refrain from competing for player services 
perpetually.92   
 The owners would also have prevailed if the arbitrator adopted another standard 
technique for resolving ambiguities where parties claim different understandings of the 
                                                        
 
89 Our thanks to Professor Paul Whitehead for these examples from his experience as General Counsel to the 
United Steelworkers of America. 
 
90 Messersmith/McNally Grievance Arbitration, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. 101 (1975) [hereinafter Messersmith]. 
 
91 Id. at 113-14. 
92 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
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contract’s text.  At the time the agreement was made, the owners did not know the players 
believed that the term permitted free agency after one renewal year, whilst the players knew 
that the owners interpreted the term as granting a perpetual right of renewal.  In these 
circumstances, the interpretive precepts established by the Restatement of Contracts93 
direct that the term should be construed in accordance with the meaning attached by the 
owners.   
 Instead, the arbitrator’s decision was based on the principal of clear statement.  
Courts and arbitrators typically disfavor perpetual options, both because their indefinite 
length limits economic flexibility and out of fear they reflect undue bargaining power.94  
Balancing these concerns against principles of contractual freedom, perpetual options are 
permitted but only with clear language expressing such intent.95  
 This decision had major implications for baseball.  MLB owners sought a federal 
court judgment vacating the arbitral award in Kansas City Royals v. MLB Players Ass’n.96   
It was clear under the Steelworkers Trilogy that a direct assault on the merits of the 
arbitrator’s decision as a matter of contract law would be unsuccessful.  
Indeed, the court of appeals had little difficulty upholding this aspect of the award.97  
 A more significant challenge on appeal was the owners’ argument that the dispute 
was not arbitrable.98  The collective bargaining agreement explicitly stated that it did “not 
deal with the reserve system” featuring no competition for player services.99   The court 
rejected this argument as well, but reviewed the question of arbitrability de novo.   
However, in upholding the arbitrability of the grievance filed by players Andy Messersmith 
and Dave McNally, the court of appeals’ review was not based on whether it was more 
probable than not that the parties intended to arbitrate.  Rather, applying Steelworkers 
Trilogy, the applicable test is whether “the record evinces the most forceful evidence of a 
purpose to exclude the grievances from arbitration.”100  
                                                        
 
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 
94 Messersmith, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 113. 
 
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). For a critique of these techniques 
in the context of interpreting a collective bargaining agreement between two sophisticated parties, see Roger 
I. Abrams, “Liberation Arbitration: The Baseball Reserve Clause Case,” in Proceedings of the 55th Annual 
Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 2003), 192. 
The result could also have been justified based on a related clear statement canon, contra preferendum, which 
requires ambiguities to be interpreted against the party who drafted them.  E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS 518-19 (2d ed. 1990). In this case, the contract language in question was drafted by the owners. 
 
96 Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 
97 Id. at 631. 
 
98 The arbitrator had considered his jurisdiction to arbitrate the underlying contract interpretation, and had 
found that the CBA conferred such jurisdiction on him.  Messersmith, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 103-10. 
 
99 Id. at 103. 
 
100 Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 532 F.2d at 621. 
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 In sum, the court refused to determine whether, as the LMRA literally requires, 
arbitration was the final method of dispute resolution of the parties.  Rather, the court found 
that “what a reasonable party might be expected to do cannot take precedence of what the 
parties actually provided for in their collective bargaining agreement.”101   Because the 
agreement did not explicitly demonstrate a clear intent to remove the matter from 
arbitration, and because federal courts believe that independent arbitration serves many 
benefits, the courts would enforce the arbitral award. 
 
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SPORTS COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE IN THE 
ABSENCE OF INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION 
 
The foregoing analysis yields the following insights about the proper scope of 
judicial review of disputes between unionized players and the league commissioner over 
disciplinary issues.  First, each sports league’s collective bargaining agreement has 
provisions for impartial grievance arbitration.  Second, absent clear intent to exclude a 
matter from impartial arbitration, the individual(s) chosen by the parties for this purpose 
has jurisdiction, and the resulting arbitral award is subject to deferential judicial review 
under the Steelworkers Trilogy standards. Judges may only vacate the award if persuaded 
that the award did not draw its essence from the agreement and was instead the arbitrator’s 
personal imposition of industrial justice.   Third, sports agreements should not be read to 
give players significantly fewer rights than non-unionized league employees and owners, 
absent clear and express language to that effect.102  In this section, we discuss the proper 
standard of judicial review, when a sports league collective bargaining agreement provides 
a clear intent to exclude certain kind of discipline from impartial arbitration, and instead 
assigns this disciplinary power to the league’s Commissioner.  We conclude that the 
appropriate standard of review -- the standard that would apply to the Commissioner in the 
absence of a collective bargain -- is the law of private associations.103 
 Each sports leagues’ CBA, to varying degrees, explicitly demonstrates a clear intent 
that certain matters are not subject to impartial arbitration, but are reserved for the 
commissioner or his designee.104  The NFL CBA provides that disputes between the parties 
                                                        
 
101 Id. at 630. 
 
102 A decision that superficially bears on this analysis is State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 120 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1086 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  The court held that a provision in the contract between the St. Louis 
Rams and its non-union equipment manager, which provided that all disputes would be resolved by the 
Commissioner, was unconscionable because of the Commissioner’s bias as an employee of the Rams and 
other clubs.  Id. at 813.  However, more careful analysis reveals that Kerr does not really address the same 
issues we discuss in this Article.  First, the issue goes to the Commissioner’s power to arbitrate disputes 
between clubs and employees, not the Commissioner’s unique power to discipline misconduct detrimental to 
the “best interests” of football.  Second, the court emphasized, in concluding the provision was 
unconscionable, that the contract term was presented in take-it-or-leave-it fashion to an unsophisticated single 
employee.  The court’s reasoning makes it clear that the court’s conclusion would not necessarily apply to a 
reasoned decision by a highly sophisticated union, with a veteran executive director and skilled legal counsel, 
to accept the Commissioner’s authority to impose discipline without resort to an independent arbitrator.   
103 For a discussion of these standards, see text accompanying notes 1-7, supra. 
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“will be resolved exclusively” by a procedure of impartial arbitration, “except wherever 
another method of dispute resolution is set forth elsewhere in this Agreement.”105 Pursuant 
to that last provision, Article 46 of the 2011 CBA provides that any dispute involving a 
fine or suspension imposed upon a player for on-field conduct, or, more broadly, “for 
conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional 
football,” is expressly withdrawn from impartial arbitration.106   
 In lieu of recourse to an independent arbitrator to review the initial Commissioner 
discipline, the NFLPA agreed that an appeal of that discipline imposed under Article 46 
will be reviewed by the Commissioner, who will designate a hearing officer, with the 
power to “render a written decision which will constitute full, final and complete 
disposition of the dispute and will be binding” upon all parties. There is no bar to the 
Commissioner serving as the hearing officer, and in fact that procedure is often the practice.  
No legal standard for the “hearing officer’s” review of the initial discipline is stated in 
Article 46.107  Nor is there a legal standard provided for judicial review of the hearing 
officer’s final determination. 
 As written, Article 46 demonstrates intent to exclude “best interest” player 
discipline from review by an independent arbitrator.  Such an election is not unusual; many 
labor agreements choose to designate certain matters as within management’s prerogative, 
or to delegate certain types of grievances to management/labor committees, or other 
internally structured non-independent hearing committees.  While these procedures are 
appropriate and common, they should not be mistakenly lumped with decisions made by 
independent arbitrators.108  
 Under our system of labor law encouraging voluntary agreement by the parties, this 
negotiated departure from the reliance on an independent arbitrator utilized throughout the 
rest of the CBA is totally appropriate.  The negotiation clearly reflects the union’s judgment 
that other CBA provisions are more meaningful to their constituency.109    
                                                        
104 See, e.g., the non-reviewable power of the NBA Commissioner to impose discipline for “on court” 
behavior by players, subject to a financial threshold, or to impose “best interest” discipline if the aggregate 
cost of the discipline to the player is less than $50,000. NBA-NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 
Article XXXI, Section 9(a), available at http://3c90sm37lsaecdwtr32v9qof.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf. 
 
105 NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 43, § 1 (2011). 
 
106 Id. at art. 46, § 1(a). 
 
107 Barbara S. Jones, In the Matter of Ray Rice (Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.espn.com/pdf/ 
2014/1128/141128_rice-summary.pdf. In the Ray Rice arbitration, an independent arbitrator was appointed 
as the hearing officer. She noted the lack of a review standard in Article 46.  Reasoning from the other 
sections of the CBA that did utilize an arbitrator, she determined that her standard of review, sitting in the 
place of the Commissioner, should be “arbitrary and capricious,” as opposed to “just cause.” In contrast, the 
standard of review by an independent arbitrator under Article 43 is just cause.  
108  Consistent with the parties’ intent, the NFL-CBA does not refer to the Article 46 process as an 
“arbitration,” but instead describes the process of review by a hearing officer as an “appeal.” Further, the 
Article’s language does not apply the label of “arbitrator” to the hearing officer.   
 
109 The relevant language of Article 46 is consistent with the language of previous NFL-CBAs going back to 
the first 1968 CBA dealing with Commissioner discipline under the “best interest” clause. 
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 If the parties want to preclude independent arbitral review of the Commissioner’s 
decision, and do not want judicial review under the common law standard analyzed above 
in Part II of this article, they can in the future agree on an express standard of review of the 
Commissioner’s decision through careful and appropriate drafting of the CBA’s text.110  
However, in lieu of such drafting, it is puzzling that the NFLPA, the NFL, and the courts 
consistently utilize the traditional review standard designed for an independent arbitrator 
articulated under the FAA and the LMRA.  These workable and effective standards are 
premised on the independence and expertise of a neutral arbitrator.  They are inappropriate 
for reviewing the unique “best interest” decisions of a sports league commissioner where 
the decision has been withdrawn from arbitration by the parties. 
 The NFL’s Article 46 procedure introduces no independent center of review, a 
premise fundamental to the Steelworkers’ policy.   Typically, the losing party’s principal 
redress for an arbitral award about which they strongly disagree is to fire the arbitrator, a 
process also unavailable under Article 46. Article 46 discipline is imposed by the 
Commissioner, and appealed to the Commissioner.  This form of governance effectively 
restores the power the Commissioner originally enjoyed over all stakeholders under private 
association law, and that has remained vested in the Commissioner with regard to owners 
and non-union employees.  Because, with regard to actions taken pursuant to Article 46, 
the NFL is in fact acting in its capacity as a private association, the appropriate standard of 
judicial review likewise should be that of a private association.  
 Consider the “Deflategate” incident where the NFL Commissioner found two club 
employees had conspired with star quarterback Tom Brady to illegally deflate footballs;111 
suppose instead that Brady was not implicated, but instead the Commissioner found that 
the employees had conspired with Patriots club President Jonathan Kraft (son of owner 
Robert Kraft)?  As noted above, without the overlay of labor law, the Commissioner’s 
authority to impose discipline on anyone is subject to judicial review under the law of 
private association.   Under cases like Turner v. Kuhn, Kraft could have challenged any 
punishment on grounds that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, that it was contrary 
to existing NFL rules, or exceeded the Commissioner’s authority.  The only difference, in 
                                                        
See supra note 17, note 55 and accompanying text. 
 
110 The text of the Major League Baseball (MLB) collective bargaining agreement that the parties most 
recently agreed to is not yet publicly available.  The 2012-16 agreement contains the following: 
 
Anything in the Grievance Procedure provided for in the Basic Agreement to the contrary 
notwithstanding, complaints or disputes as to any rights of the Players or the Clubs with respect to the 
sale or proceeds of sale of radio or television broadcasting rights in any baseball games by any kind 
or method of transmission, dissemination or reception shall not be subject to said Grievance 
Procedure. However, nothing herein or in the Grievance Procedure shall alter or abridge the rights of 
the Parties, or any of them, to resort to a court of law for the resolution of such complaint or dispute. 
 
MLB Basic Agreement, Art. XI (A)(1)(c), available at http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/4923509.pdf.  This 
language strongly suggests the parties understanding that the substantive law governing disputes over 
broadcasting rights would be determined by the applicable law in the absence of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  The matter was judicially reviewed with a decision on the merits in favor of the clubs.  Baltimore 
Orioles v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). 
111 Brady, 820 F.3d 527, 532-33 (2d. Cir. 2016). 
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our view, between Kraft and Brady is that Brady’s claim as a union worker would be filed 
in federal court and determined under the federal common law,112 while Kraft’s claim 
would be determined by the applicable state common law of private associations.  
 
To be sure, sports leagues and their players could agree that unionized workers waive rights 
they would otherwise have at common law to challenge the Commissioner disciplinary 
decisions (presumably in return for other concessions and protections in the CBA).  Indeed, 
if they so choose, they could add the following hypothetical provision: 
 
The parties agree that the Commissioner’s decision shall be final with 
regard to any determination arising under this section of the agreement, and 
expressly state their intent that the matter shall not be subject to grievance 
by the impartial arbitrator.   Any judicial review of the Commissioner’s 
decision shall be limited to determining whether the discipline drew its 
essence from the authority delegated herein to the Commissioner, and the 
decision shall only be overturned if a court determines that the 
Commissioner breached his obligation under this agreement and instead 
imposed his own industrial brand of justice. 
                                                        
 
112 A challenge to the Commissioner’s Article 46 discipline under the law of private associations may be 
brought by the NFLPA in federal court, without regard to diversity.  Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.   In Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S 448 
(1957), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what substantive law the court should apply to appeal.  
Justice Douglas wrote for the majority:  
 
The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under s 301(a)? We conclude 
that the substantive law to apply in suits under s 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion 
from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes 
some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other 
problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory 
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that 
will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the 
problem. Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. But state law, if 
compatible with the purpose of s 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best 
effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will 
not be an independent source of private rights. 
 
Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted). 
 
Applying this reasoning to a Section 46 appeal, a district court could create its own substantive law for 
standards of review.   (See discussion in note 107, supra, regarding determination of this question in the Ray 
Rice review.) This was the salutary effect of Lincoln Mills, ensuring for example that a provision in a contract 
between the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company and the United Steelworkers in Pennsylvania would be 
interpreted the same as an identical provision in a contract between the union and United States Steel in 
Indiana.  In sports, however, it would seem the better practice, in order to achieve consistency throughout the 
league, for the court to look to the state law governing the CBA to determine the applicable standards of 
review of the decisions of private associations.  In the case of the NFL CBA, this would be New York Law.  
Article 70 of the 2011 CBA provides that New York law governs the interpretation of the CBA.  Note that 
the Douglas opinion renders this state law, so applied, as federal law, and not “an independent source of 
private rights.”  Id. 
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Although such a provision is permitted, it should not be encouraged.  Judges can be tempted 
to distort the Steelworkers Trilogy standard when faced with a review of a decision by a 
partial management official as opposed to an independent arbiter.  Indeed, this is what we 
see today in the NFL disciplinary cases.  Three district judges, presented with what they 
believe is an unfair result, overturned what they are improperly calling an “arbitral award” 
by the Commissioner or his designee.  In all three cases, the circuit courts reversed these 
decisions.113   
 The 2017 reversal of the initial district court decision in Elliott is illustrative.  Judge 
Amos Mazzant took exception to procedural rulings by Hearing Officer Harold Henderson, 
a retired senior NFL executive.  The rulings denied the player the opportunity to cross-
examine the victim of alleged domestic abuse, or to cross-examine Commissioner Goodell 
as to the basis of his reasoning.114  Consider a hypothetical award by an independent and 
experienced labor arbitrator in a disciplinary case resulting in suspension without pay 
against a unionized steelworker.  What is the likelihood that a federal judge would really 
vacate an award because the arbitrator exercised discretion to rely on third-party 
interviews, and declined to call the company CEO who was involved in the initial 
disciplinary decision?  Indeed, Judge Mazzant acknowledged that “under ordinary 
circumstances, the denial of witnesses and documentary evidence falls within the discretion 
of the arbitrator.”115   However, he found extraordinary facts and serious misconduct: 
specifically, that the NFL staff withheld from Commissioner Goodell information that the 
investigator who actually interviewed the alleged victim had concluded that the victim was 
not sufficiently credible to warrant discipline.116 What are the “extraordinary facts” that 
differentiate this case from a garden-variety labor arbitration? In this case, that the hearing 
officer is a part of management and not an independent arbitrator.  The claims of procedural 
misconduct prior to the Commissioner’s decision were presented to the Hearing Officer; 
Henderson refused to allow cross-examination of the principal investigator and the 
Commissioner.  This refusal prevented the union, in Judge Mazzant’s opinion, from 
establishing that the Commissioner’s initial decision was arbitrary and capricious.117   
 The district court concluded that the “circumstances of this case are unmatched by 
any case this Court has seen,” with the only citation for this extraordinarily broad 
conclusion to the Brady case.118  The conclusion that, in labor arbitration cases, federal 
judges can consider the “entire set of circumstances” and reverse an arbitrator’s procedural 
rulings that the judge believes to lack fundamental fairness is a remarkable example of 
bootstrap reasoning.   
                                                        
113 See Peterson, Brady, and Elliott, supra note 5. 
 
114 NFL Players Ass'n v. NFL, No. 4:17-CV-00615, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS146027, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 
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 For authority, Judge Mazzant cited the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Forsythe Int'l, S.A. 
v. Gibbs Oil Co.119 In that decision, the appellate court reversed a district judges’ arbitral 
vacatur, despite strong evidence of fraud by one of the parties.  Despite the district court’s 
conclusion of egregious discovery abuse, the court of appeals in Forsythe found that “the 
necessarily limited judicial review of the arbitration award yields no justification for 
disturbing it.”120  To be fair, the opinion states that judicial review was based on “whether 
the arbitration proceedings were fundamentally unfair.” 121    Forsythe emphasized, 
however, that the statutory provision authorizing vacatur only applied to where the award 
was procured by “corruption, fraud, or undue means,” which was not present when the 
arbitrator was informed about employer misconduct.122  (In Elliott, the hearing officer was 
informed about the misconduct and nonetheless upheld the discipline).123 
 The broad language employed in Forsythe, in turn, came from another Fifth Circuit 
decision,124 which cited yet an earlier Fifth Circuit decision that vacated an award on 
procedural grounds, but only because the panel received ex parte communication in direct 
contravention of standard arbitration rules incorporated in the parties’ agreement.125   The 
first relevant Fifth Circuit precedent on point in turn cited the Second Circuit’s judgment 
in Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. United Auto Workers, where the court 
observed that the arbitrator was not required to “follow all the niceties observed by the 
federal courts” but “only grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing.”126   But Bell 
Aerospace, which appears to be the foundational precedent, expressly states that federal 
judges “may vacate the award of an arbitrator only on the grounds specified in 9 U.S.C. § 
10 (1970).” 127  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Forsythe, on which Judge Mazzant 
relied in giving relief in Elliott, itself makes clear that the broad term “fundamentally 
unfair” does not give federal judges the discretion to determine for themselves what is 
“fair,” but rather was a judicial short-hand for the statutory standards for vacatur: that (1) 
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there is evidence of 
                                                        
 
119 Id. at *19, citing 915 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990).  Note that Forsythe reviewed an arbitration under 
the FAA, not a labor arbitration under the LMRA. 
 
120 Forsythe, 915 F. 2d at 1019. 
 
121 Id. at 1020. 
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123 Elliott PI, slip op. at 3. 
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partiality or corruption among the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct 
which prejudiced the rights of one of the parties; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers. 128   In similar reasoning regarding commercial arbitration, the Fifth Circuit 
expressly rejected an effort to vacate an arbitral award that was arbitrary and capricious, 
refusing to add additional grounds to the narrow justifications for judicial review provided 
in the Federal Arbitration Act.129 
 After procedural wrangling in the Elliott case led the dispute back to New York, 
where the NFL had filed a petition to enforce the arbitral award, District Judge Katherine 
Failla reached a contrary conclusion to Judge Mazzant’s as to the scope of judicial power 
to review decisions the judge finds to be “fundamentally unfair.”  Noting that the Second 
Circuit had explicitly left the question open,130 Judge Failla persuasively reasoned from the 
Supreme Court’s teaching that courts reviewing arbitral awards under the LMRA may not 
vacate an award even if the arbitrator “committed serious errors”131 The essence of labor 
arbitration is the enforcement of terms of the agreement between labor and management, 
and “courts should not superimpose an extra-contractual definition of ‘fairness’ in 
arbitrations beyond the actual standards and procedures for which the parties bargained.”132  
Relevant to this case, and FAA precedent that faulted a commercial arbitral panel for failing 
to explain their evidentiary ruling that a key witness’ testimony was unnecessary as 
cumulative,133 Judge Failla noted that the LMRA’s purpose of facilitating efficient dispute 
resolution (of particular concern with in-season discipline in sports) would be contravened 
                                                        
 
128 Forsythe, 915 F.2d at 1021, citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(d).  The Second Circuit has addressed the relationship 
between the standards for commercial arbitration set forth in the FAA and the standards for labor arbitration 
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132 Elliott NY, slip op at 16. 
 
133 Tempo Shain, supra note 128. 
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by a more searching standard of judicial review that would induce arbitrators to prepare 
detailed and legalistic decisions to protect their awards from judicial reversal.134 
 Judge Failla also expressed questions of fairness about whether this standard would 
allow highly-paid unionized professional athletes to obtain judicial relief unavailable to 
ordinary workers.135 Our concern is that the expanding scope of federal judicial review 
pursued by the NFLPA is a two-edged sword if “fairness” is the appropriate standard to 
review decisions of labor arbitrators (given that the parties have been treating (in our view 
incorrectly) league commissioners or their designees as such.  This creates unwarranted 
opportunities for management (which is usually better resourced than unions in their ability 
to pursue appeals on disciplinary issues) to find sympathetic federal judges willing to 
overturn arbitral awards in favor of workers or players on grounds that what the judge 
perceives as a misguided award was caused by “fundamental unfairness” in the 
proceeding.136  
   Sound policy reasons suggest that the well-developed common law of private 
association that applies to owners and non-union employees should also apply to 
decisions by Commissioners applicable to players, where the Commissioner’s decision is 
not subject to impartial arbitration (absent express language in the CBA to the contrary).  
For these reasons, the same technique of clear statement that led the Supreme Court to 
presume that parties intend disputes to be arbitrated should be used to presume that 
unionized employees (i.e., NFL players) do not have fewer rights for judicial review of 
discipline than their owners, nor their non-union colleagues in the workplace.  
 We acknowledge that, in many cases, judicial review under the law of private 
associations and judicial review under the Steelworkers Trilogy will yield similar results.137  
Well-reasoned judgments by a sports league commissioner that are faithful to the league’s 
                                                        
 
134 Elliott NY, slip op. at 17, citing Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration As A Continuation of the Collective 
Bargaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 595 (1990). 
 
135 Id., citing Michael Z. Green & Kyle T. Carney, Can NFL Players Obtain Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Decisions on the Merits When A Typical Hourly Union Worker Cannot Obtain This Unusual Court Access?, 
20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 442–43 (2017). 
 
136 Professor Mark Greenbaum expresses the view that if the appeals court adopted the union’s argument that 
the Federal Arbitration Act’s fundamental fairness doctrine warrants vacating Henderson’s decision, it would 
give all unions increased ability to challenge other unsatisfactory arbitration awards.  Rhodes, supra note 11.  
The reason that the legendary counsel to the United Steelworkers, David Feller, so aggressively pursued the 
principle of judicial deference to arbitrators in the Steelworkers Trilogy reflects the more conventional union 
perspective that judicial review tends to favor management. 
137 In one respect, treating sports league commissioner’s decisions as equivalent to that of a labor arbitrator 
may result in more favorable treatment for the employee.  As noted in Brief of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee’s Petition for Panel 
Rehearing or Rehearing en banc, NFL Management Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, No. 15-2801(L) (2d Cir.), 
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the employer at the time of discipline. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 39-40 & 
n.8 (1987).  The brief, id., also cites a leading treatise for the proposition that additional reasons cannot be 
added later to strengthen the employer’s case.  See NORMAN BRAND & MELLISA H. BIREN, DISCIPLINE AND 
DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION Ch. 2.II.A.3, p. 50 (2d ed. 2008).  In contrast, the Commissioner would only be 
precluded under private association law from considering additional facts if the league’s rules or practices so 
provided. 
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rules and precedents will be upheld under either standard.  Decisions that impose the 
Commissioner’s personal brand of industrial justice, rather than drawing their essence from 
the CBA (subject to vacatur under labor arbitration rules), are likely to be found arbitrary 
or contrary to league rules (subject to invalidation under private association doctrine).  
Moreover, judges who themselves are tempted to impose their own brand of justice can 
easily fulfill their formal responsibilities to follow doctrine by pronouncing the correct 
labels.  Thus, even though precedents applying Steelworkers Trilogy make it clear that an 
arbitrator’s decision cannot be overturned because in the reviewing court’s opinion the 
arbitrator misinterpreted the CBA,138 a recent court of appeals vacated an award because 
the arbitrator’s misinterpretation of “plain meaning” showed that the award did not draw 
its essence from the contract.139  Alternatively, in the Finley case discussed above, had the 
court of appeals felt that the Commissioner’s act was unjust, the court could have decided 
the action was based on malicious animosity, and reversed on that ground.   
 We therefore do not claim that any particular decision necessarily would have been 
decided differently had the correct standard been used.  However, the split panel decision 
Brady suggests that the issues would have been considered and debated in a different way, 
and the NFLPA might well have prevailed under the law of private associations. 140 
Examination of Chief Judge Katzmann’s useful dissent in Brady reveals it was largely due 
to the Commissioner’s failure to reconcile the well-established and relatively minor penalty 
for wide receivers using improper “stickum,” which gives them an advantage in catching 
a football, with what he perceived as a similar offense in deflating a football, thereby giving 
a quarterback an advantage in passing the ball.  He wrote: 
 
Precisely because of the severity of the penalty, one would have expected 
the Commissioner to at least fully consider other alternative and collectively 
bargained-for penalties, even if he ultimately rejected them. Indeed, the 
CBA encourages—though, as the majority observes, does not strictly 
require—the Commissioner to fully explain his reasoning by mandating that 
he issue a written decision when resolving an Article 46 appeal. That 
                                                        
 
138 Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1987).   
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140 In Peterson, the other major recent decision, the principal ground of appeal was that the Commissioner 
imposed a policy retroactively by issuing more severe discipline than he had in prior cases  The 8 th Circuit 
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process is all the more important when the disciplinary action is novel and 
the Commissioner's reasoning is, as here, far from obvious. 
 
Yet, the Commissioner failed to even mention, let alone explain, a highly 
analogous penalty, an omission that underscores the peculiar nature of 
Brady's punishment. The League prohibits the use of stickum, a substance 
that enhances a player's grip. Under a collectively bargained-for Schedule 
of Fines, a violation of this prohibition warrants an $8,268 fine in the 
absence of aggravating circumstances. Given that both the use of stickum 
and the deflation of footballs involve attempts at improving one's grip and 
evading the referees' enforcement of the rules, this would seem a natural 
starting point for assessing Brady's penalty. Indeed, the League's 
justification for prohibiting stickum—that it "affects the integrity of the 
competition and can give a team an unfair advantage," —is nearly identical 
to the Commissioner's explanation for what he found problematic about the 
deflation—that it "reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive 
advantage in, and threatens the integrity of, the game."141 
 
An impartial expert labor arbitrator is not bound by precedent and does not have to 
explain any deviation from similar cases.  That is because the parties have bargained for 
the arbitrator’s judgment.  In contrast, under the law of private association, those charged 
by the association’s governing documents with internal decision making are obliged to 
follow rules in a way that is not arbitrary.  The law of private associations recognizes that 
non-parties may be subject to association rules, and judicial review to ensure consistent 
rule compliance is therefore appropriate.142  As discussed in Finley,143 the court of appeals 
reviewing the Commissioner’s exercise of the best interests power against an owner was 
comfortable in evaluating the Commissioner’s contention that previously approved cash 
sales of players were of a different quality and magnitude than the ones disapproved in the 
case sub judice.  In contrast, the Brady court felt constrained by the context of labor law.  
The majority in Brady expressly noted that the CBA did not require the “arbitrator” to 
explain his reasoning.144  The majority viewed the inability of the NFL to explain why 
Brady’s misconduct was so severe as irrelevant.  However, this inability may well have 
persuaded one of these judges that Commissioner Goodell’s decision was not consistent 
with league rules (the standard for private association challenges), even if – perceiving him 
as a labor arbitrator -- his overall judgment “drew its essence” from the CBA.   
 Another ground for appeal in Brady was the NFLPA’s claim that the published 
rules specified that first offenses for equipment violations “will result in fines.”145  Judge 
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Parker’s majority decision appears to reject this claim on the merits.  It emphasized a 
provision of the NFL rules document stating that suspensions may also be imposed based 
on the circumstances.146  However, the opinion is not clear on this point—it goes on to state 
that “even if other readings were plausible, the Commissioner's interpretation of this 
provision as allowing for a suspension would easily withstand judicial scrutiny because his 
interpretation would be at least "barely colorable," which, again, is all that the law 
requires.”147 This seems to be a correct way of re-wording the “draws its essence from the 
contract” standard for labor arbitrators.  In contrast, the law of private associations would 
not likely uphold an official’s unpersuasive and unjustified interpretation simply because 
it was “barely colorable.” 
 The vulnerability of the Article 46 discipline to judicial review under the law of 
private association is even stronger in the Elliott dispute.  The NFLPA challenged 
Commissioner Goodell’s six game suspension for domestic abuse on the basis of 
procedural unfairness.  The specific grounds that the complaining witness was not credible, 
and that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair, because the league’s internal hearing 
officer refused to allow cross-examination of the putative victim or the Commissioner.  
There is ample precedent under the law of private association to obtain judicial review if 
the NFLPA’s lawyers could persuade a reviewing judge of fundamental procedural 
unfairness.148 
Another issue concerns the “internal” standard of review that is used by the 
arbitrator or internal officer.  Article 46 is silent on this question. In three recent internal 
decisions under Article 46, the designated hearing officers used three different standards.149 
In Bountygate, 150  former Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, acting as Hearing Officer, 
articulated a standard of “consistency of treatment, uniformity of standards for parties 
similar situated and patent unfairness or selectivity” in determining whether the initial 
disciplinary decision should be upheld.  In Ray Rice,151 retired federal judge Barbara Jones, 
acting as Hearing Officer, determined that the union had the burden of showing that the 
initial discipline was “arbitrary and capricious.”  In Peterson, NFL Labor Relations Vice 
President Harold Henderson, acting as Hearing Officer, rejected the appeal on the ground 
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A.2d 152, 161 (N.J. App. Div. 2006) (requiring a “fair opportunity of the member to respond to the charges”).  
See generally notes 29-33, supra, and accompanying text.   
149 Inferentially, the standard is less rigorous than the “just cause” standard typically used by independent 
arbitrators to review disciplinary matters.  NFL CBA Art. 42 provides for such a review of club discipline, 
but Art. 43(3)(b) specifically provides that any club discipline is preempted by Commissioner discipline 
imposed pursuant to Art. 46. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 42, 43(3)(b) (2011). 
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that “the player has not demonstrated that the process and procedures surrounding his 
discipline were not fair and consistent.”152   
 If the law of private association were to apply to review Article 46 discipline, a 
player seeking judicial review would have alternative theories to attack the Hearing 
Officer’s decision: (1) That it improperly affirmed an initial disciplinary decision that was 
itself arbitrary and capricious, or tarred with fundamentally unfair procedures, and (2) that 
the Hearing Officer breached league rules by applying a standard that was markedly 
different from pre-existing association practice.   
 It is not clear that there is a marked difference between the three standards recently 
employed (although Tagliabue’s articulation is arguably clearer and perhaps worthy of 
emulation; the reasoning of the hearing officer in Rice is open to question153).  Consider 
the possibility, however, that a subsequent hearing officer read the Peterson standard 
articulated by Henderson narrowly, to provide review only for procedures, and not the 
substance of the initial disciplinary decision.  Under the law of private association, we 
believe that a court would be justified in overturning a decision where the Hearing Officer 
did expressly determine that the discipline was consistent with uniform standards for 
parties similarly situated, or did not consider on the merits a player’s claim that he was the 
victim of patent unfairness or selectivity.  In both Brady and Peterson (Rice was not 
appealed), the appellate courts disregarded the question whether the “arbitrator” applied 
the proper standard of review for the hearing officer under Article 46.  Absent a specific 
clear standard, an impartial and expert labor arbitrator selected by the parties to resolve 
disputes is free to select any standard, as long as it drew its essence from the contract.  
Under the law of private associations, that question would be prominent for the reviewing 
court. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For nearly six decades, federal courts have worked hard to develop a system that 
facilitates peaceful resolution of industrial disputes through the designation of an impartial 
expert to arbitrate disputes.  To achieve this goal requires judges to engage in uncommon 
self-restraint, refusing to step in even when they perceive a legally-trained tribune has erred 
in factual findings or legal conclusions.  At the same time, federal labor law promotes 
industrial harmony by allowing unions and employers to make their own bargains, 
including the removal of disputes from impartial arbitration.  However, given the judicial 
and legislative preference for arbitration, such an agreement must be express. 
                                                        
 
152 Letter Decision from Harold Henderson to Jeffrey L. Kessler & Daniel L. Nash (Dec. 12, 2014), at 8 (on 
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153 The absence of an articulated standard of review in Article 46 is an inherent deficiency in the CBA.  It is 
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 When the parties do expressly agree to resolve disputes by means other than 
impartial labor arbitration, the question arises as to the appropriate standard of review of 
that decision.  We believe that the appropriate standard is the common law baseline that 
would have existed were the employees not protected by a collective bargaining agreement.   
Because employees involved in sports leagues have no choice but to subject themselves to 
league rules, reviewing courts have examined sports league decisions under the law of 
private associations, and have insisted that league officials taking adverse action must act 
in conformance with the authorized powers, consistently with league rules, and the decision 
must not be arbitrary or capricious.   
 Applying the standards of review appropriate for an expert impartial arbitrator to a 
management decision expressly withdrawn from arbitration is not appropriate.  It creates 
the anomalous situation where a non-union employee’s common law rights might exceed 
those of a unionized worker.  More significantly, it risks distorting the law of labor arbitral 
review, because of judges’ inevitable tendency to view a management decision differently.  
To be sure, union representatives and management executives are free to impose whatever 
standard they want, regardless of what others may think, but if they are going to adopt a 
standard designed for other purposes, they should have to do so expressly.  Absent such an 
express incorporation of Steelworkers Trilogy language into a standard of review of a 
matter withdrawn from arbitration, challenges to Commissioner’s decisions should proceed 
to federal court under section 301 of the LMRA under the common law standard of the law 
of private associations. 
 
